"Film and Philosophical Analysis of Black Mirror: Be Right Back"
By Elise Pahlow Black Mirror (2013),
Season 2, Episode 01: "Be Right Back"
Written by Charlie Brooker, Directed by Owen Harris
4/5
***SPOILERS***
The stunning return of the miniseries Black Mirror, returns with the same level of intelligence and emotional intensity as season one. In the first episode of season 2 "Be Right Back" explores grief in the future. This episode particularly deals with how technology has become not only an integral part of our every day existence and means of recording and capturing our experiences but also whether or not in fact all the pieces of our experiences and our very selves that we project into media actually make up our very identity.
Be Right Back explores notions of "psychological continuity" and "identity". This episode calls into question profound philosophical questions of philosophy of mind. In particular it explores the notion of psychological continuity as the defining feature of identity. This is separate from the notion of "numerical identity" which is the notion of an object or person existing as a single numerically distinct thing over time (Stone, 1987, p. 824). Thus when the "real" Ash (played by Domhnall Gleeson) (Ash 1) who died is numerically distinct from the "artificial" Ash (Ash 2) that Martha purchases and helps construct. The mere fact that these two beings exist separately makes them not only numerically distinct, but also qualitatively distinct. Thus qualitative identity is what people commonly associate with the term "identity"; that is the characteristics of personality, mannerism etc that make us different from each other.
Identity also includes the notion of psychological continuity which is the concept that a person's identity consists of a narrative of continuous experiences and self-awareness of your own life narrative (Stone, 1987, p. 826). That is to say that by point of fact that Ash 1 and Ash 2 are separate entities, different in terms of qualities and experiences.
This is all setting aside the intriguing and confronting notions that a person can be constructed not only from the information gathered online and personal media documentation, but can also be altered and controlled by their "administrator". This episode really plays with the idea of the construction of memory, particularly the memory of other people. It also asks the question are we really the sum of our parts? Are we all the little pieces, the mannerism, physical characteristics or is there more to us? This episode seems to follow the line of thought that psychological continuity is necessary and sufficient for personal identity. Thus, as Ash 2 lacks psychological continuity with Ash 1, i.e. that he doesn't maintain continuous consciousness and narrative experiences of Ash 1, then under that definition Ash 2 is not qualitatively the same as Ash 1. Therefore Ash 2 does not have the same "identity" as Ash 1. He is not the same person. In common language we use the term "person" to mean a number of different things, often using "person" to refer to "identity". In Black Mirror: Be Right Back (2013) Martha (Hayley Atwell) refers to Ash 2 by saying "you're not him" she has come to realise that a "person" their very "identity" (i.e. what makes them, them and distinct from other people) is not just the surface features, mannerisms or even the memories themselves and thus Ash 2 is not the same "person" (qualitative identity and numerical identity) as Ash 1.
All the identity issues aside, there is the emotional, psychological and ethical issues surrounding the simulation of Ash 1 with Ash 2. This episode really challenges the notion of the necessity of grief and acceptance that someone has died and no longer exists. Instead the "person" can be reconstructed from all the available information, simulating their voice and even their appearance and mannerisms. However it is quickly revealed that however much Ash 2 resembles and acts like Ash 1 he is still merely a prop, a doll for Martha making the realisation that Ash 1 is truly gone forever even more painful. This poses a profound ethical dilemma about whether if we could simulate someone who has died whether a) we should, b) whether it is emotionally healthy and c) whether it is wrong to create a simulation of a person that has sentience (i.e. conscious awareness and ability to feel pain) as a replacement (Stone, 1987, p. 821). Ash 2 clearly has partial sentience as he is a conscious being, but he lacks the ability to feel pain. This is demonstrated in the scene where Martha knocks the glass off the table and Ash 2 "cuts" himself but shows no sign of pain, or distress and only notices it when he looks at the "wound". Thus Ash 2 is not fully sentient although he appears to be self-aware. Self awareness is a beings ability to be aware that it is conscious (Stone, 1987, p. 821). Ash 2 is aware from the beginning that he is a replica, a clone, a simulation. Many of these science fiction and philosophy of mind elements are reminiscent of other novels and films. For instance there is a strong similarity to Solaris by Stanislaw Lem (with film adaptations by director Andrey Tarkovskiy (1972) and later remade by director Steven Soderbergh (2002)). Solaris explores the notion of an alien stellar body discovered in space that begins to produce emanations that appear to simulate people. Other films that explore similar notions of personhood and identity are A.I. Artificial Intelligence (2001) where you are able to purchase a robotic child that can simulate love.
Where other films and literature have traditionally shied away from these simulations, ultimately rejecting them as monstrous, Black Mirror: Be Right Back goes a step towards challenging that notion with the ending of the episode. That despite the fact that Martha comes to realise that Ash 2 is not and can never truly be or even "replace" Ash 1 she is unable to "kill" him and this is the heart of the emotional difficulty. That urge to hold on in grief to any sort of replacement however small is such a powerful drive that Ash 2 is better than no Ash at all and thus Martha and Ash's (Ash 1) daughter is able to grow up knowing "Ash" in a sense. This leaves the audience with an uncomfortable feeling. Are we truly replaceable? If technology developed even further and Ash 2 were able to fully replicate and simulate Ash 1, would it matter? Would a perfect copy of Ash 1 be as good as Ash 1 (the original). And even further, if Ash had died and instead of Martha being notified of his death, he had merely been "cloned" or simulated with all the mannerisms etc, as is Ash 2, only more perfect, would it be the same? Would Martha have noticed?
What seems to be the major difference portrayed in Be Right Back between Ash 1 and Ash 2 is the naturalistic drives, he is mechanical. He is programmed and unable to respond or uses researched responses when he doesn't have a personalised response recorded. Is this merely an extreme version of how our own brains work anyway? Aren't we just simulating machines, learning through repetition, experiences and research? Learning through observing others and learning by simulating others.
Another interesting aspect is the different concepts of grief, so while Martha cannot cope and refuses to move on and instead opts for the nightmarish simulation of Ash, her sister assumes that she has found someone new. Also the scene early in the episode where Ash 1 talks about his mother's own process of grieving, how she put away all the photos of his brother and later his father soon after their deaths. Ash 1 seems to find this process of grieving to be strange, as if it is somehow a rejection of the memory of the person. But the simulation of Ash 2 calls into question issues of memory and perception of other people. Because Ash 2 is merely Martha's perception of Ash 1, not Ash 1 himself. She makes this clear when she attempts to provoke his anger even asking him to hit her. These scenes point out that Ash 2 has no will or drive of his own.
Overall like the other episodes of Black Mirror, Be Right Back is both challenging intellectually and emotionally. The performances are amazing and complimented beautifully by the subtly gorgeous visual style and cinematography.
References
Stone, J (1987). Why potentiality matters, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 17:4 (1987:Dec).
Lem, Stanislaw (1961). "Solaris".
Filmography
A.I. Artifical Intelligence (2001). Steven Spielberg.
Solaris (2002). Steven Soderbergh.
Solaris (1972). Andrey Tarkovskiy.
